Abstract-In coding schemes for the wire-tap channel or the broadcast channels with confidential messages, it is well known that the sender needs to use a stochastic encoding to avoid the information about the transmitted confidential message to be leaked to an eavesdropper. In this paper, it is investigated that the trade-off between the rate of the random number to realize the stochastic encoding and the rates of the common, private, and confidential messages. For the direct theorem, the superposition coding scheme for the wire-tap channel recently proposed by Chia and El Gamal is employed, and its strong security is proved. The matching converse theorem is also established. Our result clarifies that a combination of the ordinary stochastic encoding and the channel prefixing by the channel simulation is suboptimal.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wire-tap channel is one sender and two receivers broadcast channel model in which the sender, usually referred to as Alice, wants to transmit a confidential message to the legitimate receiver, usually referred to as Bob, in such a way that the other receiver, usually referred to as eavesdropper Eve, cannot get any information about the transmitted message. The wire-tap channel model was first introduced by Wyner in his seminal paper [1] . Later, Csiszár and Körner investigated the model called broadcast channels with confidential messages (BCC) in which Alice also sends a common message that is supposed to be decoded by both Bob and Eve. These models were further investigated by many researchers from theoretical point of view (e.g.. see [2] ), and recently it has attracted considerable attention from practical point of view as a physical layer security.
In coding schemes for the wire-tap channel or the BCC, it is well known that the sender needs to use a stochastic encoder to avoid the information about the transmitted confidential message to be leaked to Eve. The stochastic encoding is usually realized by preparing a dummy random number in addition to the intended messages and by encoding them to a transmitted signal by a deterministic encoder. Furthermore, when the channel to Bob is not more capable than the channel to Eve, it is known that the sender needs to use the channel prefixing to achieve the capacity region (or the secrecy capacity) because the capacity formulas involve such a channel from an auxiliary random variable to the random variable describing the input signal of the channel [3] . In literatures, it is assumed that there exists a channel realizing the channel prefixing. But in practice the prefixing channel must be simulated from a random number by using a method such as the channel simulation [4] , which usually involves certain amount of simulation error depending on the amount of the random number. So far, there was no paper investigating how much random number is needed to achieve the capacity region. Since the random number is precious resource in practice, though it has been paid no attention in literatures, it is extremely important to investigate the amount of random number needed to achieve the capacity region. For this purpose, we formulate the problem of the BCC by randomness constrained stochastic encoder, and completely characterize the capacity region of this new problem.
The present problem to consider the randomness constrained stochastic encoder is motivated by the authors' previous results in [5] . In that paper, the capacity region of the relay channel with confidential messages for the completely deterministic encoder was investigated, and the capacity region was characterized for the BCC as a corollary. In this paper, we are interested in the case such that the randomness is constrained but not zero. The result in [5] can be regarded as an extreme case of the present problem. On the other hand, the conventional BCC problem can be regarded as the other extreme case, in which the amount of randomness that can be used at the encoder is unbounded.
Typically in the BCC, Alice sends the common message that is supposed to be decoded by both Bob and Eve, and the confidential message that is supposed to be decoded only by Bob. The level of secrecy of the confidential message is usually evaluated by the equivocation rate. In this paper, we consider slightly different problem formulation, which has been appeared in the literature [6] , [5] . In our problem setting, Alice sends three kinds of messages, the common message, the private message, and the confidential messages. The common message is supposed to be decoded by both Bob and Eve. The private message is supposed to be decoded by Bob, and we do not care whether Eve can decode the private message or not. The confidential message is supposed to be decoded by Bob, and it must be kept completely secret from Eve. Furthermore, for stochastic encoding, Alice is allowed to use limited amount of dummy randomness. Thus, we are interested in the trade-off between quadruple of rates, the rate of dummy randomness, the rates of common, private, and confidential messages. The coding system of our formulation is depicted in Fig. 1 .
The reason we do not use the equivocation rate formulation is as follows. In the conventional equivocation rate formulation, if the rate of dummy randomness is not sufficient, a part of the confidential message is sacrificed to make the other part completely secret and the rate of the completely secret part corresponds to the equivocation rate. We think that the rates Fig. 1 . The coding system investigated in this paper. Alice sends common message Kn, private message Ln, and confidential message Sn by using a deterministic function fn and a limited amount of dummy randomness An. The common message is supposed to be decoded by both Bob and Eve. The private message is supposed to be decoded by Bob, and we do not care whether Eve can decode the private message or not. The confidential message is supposed to be decoded by Bob, and it must be kept completely secret from Eve.
of sacrificed part and completely secret part become clearer by employing our formulation.
As we have mentioned above, the typical coding scheme for the wire-tap channel or the BCC consists of the stochastic encoding and the channel prefixing. In [7] , Chia and El Gamal proposed an alternative coding scheme that utilizes the so-called superposition coding [8] instead of the channel prefixing. In the direct part of our main result, we employ this superposition scheme instead of the channel prefixing. We also clarifies that a straightforward combination of the ordinary stochastic coding and the channel prefixing by the channel simulation method is suboptimal.
Although Chia and El Gamal showed that the superposition coding scheme can realize the so-called weak security criterion [9] , [10] , it was not clear whether the superposition coding scheme can realize the so-called strong security criterion. One of technical contributions of this paper is to show that Chin and El Gamal's superposition coding scheme can realize the strong security criterion. This is done by using the technique proposed in [11] , and by considering the channel resolvability problem [12] with the superposition coding. Note that the relationship between the wire-tap channel coding and the channel resolvability was first pointed out by Csiszár [10] , and is well recognized recently [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] . The channel resolvability with the superposition coding was first investigated by the second author in [17] . In that paper, the channel resolvability problem with the superposition coding for the degraded broadcast channel was considered to show the converse theorem of the identification via degraded broadcast channels. In this paper, the channel resolvability problem with the superposition coding for a single channel is considered. Using the superposition coding for a single channel seems nonsense at first glance, it does have a meaning when applied to the wire-tap channel or the BCC.
After the submission of the first manuscript of this paper, we noticed some related works investigating the importance of random number in the BCC or the wire-tap channel. In [18] , Hayashi and Matsumoto considered the secure multiplex coding [19] in which the messages are not necessarily uniform nor independent and the entropy rate of the messages might be constrained. Although the secure multiplex coding can be regarded as a generalization of the BCC, the encoder can use unlimited amount of dummy randomness in addition to the messages in their problem formulation. Thus, our results cannot be derived from their results. In [20] , Bloch and Kliewer considered the wire-tap channel in which the dummy randomness is constrained and not necessarily uniform. However, they only considered the case such that the channel to Bob is more capable than that to Eve. In such a case, the channel prefixing is not needed, and their result corresponds to Corollary 11 in this paper when the dummy randomness is uniform.
Because of the lack of space, proofs of main results are omitted in this paper, which can be found in [21] .
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND MAIN RESULTS

A. Problem Formulation
Let P Y |X and P Z|X be two channels with common input alphabet X and output alphabets Y and Z respectively. Throughout the paper, the alphabets are assumed to be finite though we do not use finiteness of the alphabet except cardinality bonds on auxiliary random variables. We also assume that the base of logarithm is e throughout the paper.
Let K n be the set of the common message, L n be the set of the private message, and S n be the set of the confidential message. The common message is supposed to be decoded by both Bob and Eve. The private message is supposed to be decoded by Bob, and we do not care whether Eve can decode the private message or not. The confidential message is supposed to be decoded by Bob, and it must be kept completely secret from Eve.
Typically, Alice use a stochastic encoder to make the confidential message secret from Eve, and it is practically realized by using a uniform dummy randomness on the alphabet A n . When the size |A n | of dummy randomness is infinite, any stochastic encoder from K n ×L n ×S n to X n can be simulated by a deterministic encoder
n . But we are interested in the case with bounded size |A n | in this paper.
Bob's decoder is defined by function g n : Y n → K n ×L n × S n and the error probability is defined as
where 1[·] is the indicator function. Eve's decoder is defined by function φ n : Z n → K n and the error probability P err (f n , φ n ) is defined in a similar manner as Eq. (1).
Let
be the output distributions of the channel P n Z|X . In this paper, we consider the security criterion given by
where D(· ·) is the divergence, and I(·; ·) is the mutual information [8] . The coding system investigate in this paper is depicted in Fig. 1 . In this paper, we are interested in the trade-off among the rate the dummy randomness, and the rates of the common, private, and confidential messages.
Definition 1: The rate quadruple (R d , R 0 , R 1 , R s ) is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of Alice's deterministic encoder
lim sup
lim inf
Then the achievable region R is defined as the set of all achievable rate quadruples.
B. Statements of General Results
The following is our main result in this paper. Theorem 2: Let R * be a closed convex set consisting of those quadruples (R d , R 0 , R 1 , R s ) for which there exist auxiliary random variables (U, V ) such that U ↔ V ↔ X ↔ (Y, Z) and
Then we have R = R * . Moreover, it may be assumed that V = (U, V ) and that the ranges of U and V may be assumed to satisfy |U| ≤ |X | + 3 and |V | ≤ |X | + 1.
The conditions on R 0 and R 1 + R s in Eqs. (9) and (10) resemble the conditions in the broadcast channel with degraded message sets [22] . The condition on R s in Eq. (11) exists because there is a security requirement on the confidential message. These conditions are exactly the same as those in the conventional BCC (see Corollary 5) . The conditions on R 1 and R d in Eqs. (12) and (13) additionally appear in Theorem 2 because there are randomness constraints in our problem setting.
Remark 3: As we will find in the achievability proof of the main theorem, the private message can be used as dummy randomness to protect the confidential message from Eve. Thus, if we define the achievable rate regionR by replacing Eq. (7) with
regionR is broader than region R. Indeed,R is a closed convex set consisting of those quadruples (R d , R 0 , R 1 , R s ) for which there exist auxiliary random variables (U, V ) satisfying the same conditions as Theorem 2 except Eq. (12) 1 . Remark 4: Eq. (13) means that there is a certain amount of dummy randomness that cannot be substituted by the private message. Note that the difference between the private message and the dummy randomness is whether Bob needs to decode it or not.
be the set of all achievable triplet (R 0 , R 1 , R s ) by arbitrary stochastic encoder. By taking sufficiently large R d , we recover the following well known result [3] 2 . Corollary 5: ( [3] ) Region R ∞ is a closed convex set consisting of those triplet (R 0 , R 1 , R s ) for which there exist auxiliary random variables
be the set of all rate triplets that can be achieved by deterministic encoder. This extreme case was solved in [5] , which can be also derived as a corollary of Theorem 2 3 . Corollary 6: ( [5] ) Let R * det be a closed convex set consisting of those triplet (R 0 , R 1 , R s ) for which there exists an auxiliary random variable U such that U ↔ X ↔ (Y, Z) and
be the infimum rate of dummy randomness needed to achieve the rates (R 0 , R s ). From Theorem 2, we can characterize not only the known extreme cases (Corollary 5 and Corollary 6) but also this quantity.
is the optimal solution of the following optimization problem:
As a corollary of Theorem 2, we also have the following. Corollary 8: Let R * ds be a closed convex set consisting of those rate pair (R d , R s ) for which there exist auxiliary random
Then we have R ds = R * ds .
Remark 9:
The auxiliary random variable U in Corollary 8 only plays a role of time-sharing. Thus, the range of U may be assumed to satisfy |U| ≤ 2. The same remark is also applied for Corollary 11.
be the secrecy capacity, which can be characterized by the supremum of the rate R s for which there exists auxiliary random variable V such that V ↔ X ↔ (Y, Z) and
To achieve the rate given by the right hand side of Eq. (17), we conventionally used the following coding scheme. First, we construct a wire-tap channel code for channel pairs P Y |V and P Z|V . Then, the code word in V n is transmitted over prefixing channel P n X|V . If we simulate channel P n X|V by using the channel simulation method [4] , then we need randomness with rate H(X|V ) 4 . By using this argument, we can derive the following inner bound on R ds that can be achieved by combining the ordinary wire-tap channel coding and the channel prefixing by the channel simulation method.
Proposition 10: Let R * sim be a closed convex set consisting of those rate pair (R d , R s ) for which there exist auxiliary
Then we have R * sim ⊂ R ds . Since I(X; Z|U ) = I(V ; Z|U ) + I(X; Z|V ) < I(V ; Z|U ) + H(X|V ) in general, the region R * ds is strictly broader than the region R * sim , i.e., the straightforward combination of the ordinary wire-tap channel coding and the channel prefixing by the channel simulation is suboptimal.
Corollary 11: Suppose that the channel P Y |X is more capable than P Z|X . Then the region R ds = R * ds is a closed convex set consisting of those rate pair (R d , R s ) for which there exists an auxiliary random variable U such that U ↔ X ↔ (Y, Z) and
Moreover, it may be assumed that the ranges of U may be assumed to satisfy |U| ≤ 2.
As we can find from Corollary 11, we do not need auxiliary random variable V when the channel P Y |X is more capable than P Z|X . Thus, two regions R * ds and R * sim coincide.
C. Numerical Examples
First, we consider an example such that R * ds and R * sim coincide. Suppose that P Y |X and P Z|X are binary symmetric channels with crossover probabilities ε 1 and ε 2 respectively, where ε 1 < ε 2 . In this case, P Z|X is degraded version of P Y |X , which also implies that P Y |X is more capable than P Z|X . Thus, we can apply Corollary 11. Since the auxiliary random variable U only plays a role of time sharing, region R ds is the convex hull of the rates
for some input distribution 0 ≤ P X (0) = p ≤ 1, where h(·) is the binary entropy function 5 and x * y = x(1 − y) + (1 − x)y is the binary convolution. In Fig. 2 , for the case with ε 1 = 0.1 and ε 2 = 0.2 respectively, the region R ds is plotted. The input distribution achieving C s is the uniform distribution, and thus R s is constant when R d ≥ log 2 − h(0.2). By using a biased input distribution, R s can be positive even if R d is smaller than log 2 − h(0.2).
Next, we consider an example such that R * ds and R * sim do not coincide. Suppose that P Y |X is a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability ε and P Z|X is a binary erasure channel with erasure probability δ. When 4ε(1 − ε) log 2 < δ log 2 ≤ h(ε), it is known that P Y |X is not more capable than P Z|X [23] . For this example, we can compute the regions R ds = R * ds as follows. Since R * ds is a convex set, for each R d , we can calculate max{R s : (R d , R s ) ∈ R * ds } by minimizing max with respect to μ ≥ 0, where μ is the slope of the supporting line of R * ds . Since U only plays the role of the times sharing in Eq. (20), we can take U to be constant. Furthermore, by using the support lemma [6] , we can assume that |V| ≤ |X | = 2. Thus, Eq. (20) can be calculated by exhaustive search of three parameters P V (0), P X|V (0|0), and P X|V (1|1). Since P V (0) = 1 2 is not necessarily optimal 6 for R d < (1 − δ) log 2, further reduction of parameters seems difficult. The region R * sim can be computed in a similar manner.
In Fig. 3 , for the case with ε = 0.11 and δ = 0.45 respectively, the region R ds = R * ds and R * sim are plotted.
